Comment on Lockwood Simon Saunders
Michael Lockwood has, with his usual elegance and fluency, laid out a careful and accessible overview of Everett's ideas and some of the ways in which they have been developed, not least by himself. Although there are important areas of disagreement between us, there are a number of essential things on which we agree. The criticisms that follow, then, may give a misleading impression of the debt that I for one owe to Lockwood's writings.
The areas of disagreement are important, however; one concerns the overall aspect of the account, focusing as it does on mentality and the nature of consciousness. The other concerns probability, and in particular the hypothesis, originally formulated by Deutsch, that for each component of the state there exists a continuous infinity of physically identical worlds, or, as understood by Lockwood, of identical minds. The same hypothesis, arrived at by slightly different reasoning, is made by Albert and Loewer. In my view Everett's views can be consistently developed without either of these features; mentality per se has no more fundamental a role here than in classic physics, and the infinite multiplicities can be dispensed with.
In what follows I will focus on the former claim. I have argued for the latter elsewhere:
1 here I will only say that once Albert's and Loewer's Replies notion of transcendental individuality is abandoned-and Lockwood is quite right to abandon it-there is no longer any point to the infinite multiplicities (whether of minds or worlds). At best they provide a picturesque idea of how different components of the state can be assigned different measures. It is only picturesque: the measure cannot be defined in terms of the cardinalities or ratios of cardinalities of these infinite sets. The notion of identity over time was the critical one, as Albert and Loewer recognized, and if this is given up we do not have the 'mindless hulk' problem, no more than in the analogous situation of Parfitian fission. With this we are back to the question of how indeterministic change is to be understood. But I think we are the wiser for the digression through Albert's and Loewer's account. The difficulty is entirely bound up with personal identity. Even in the deterministic case we have the same problem; considering space-time as a whole as a purely metrical structure, it seems there is no adequate notion of 'becoming' or 'passage' through time. In both cases what is wanted is a certain intuitive self-evidence; correspondingly, it is denied that formal conditions of adequacy are sufficient. This is in my view a mistake, but the debate is obviously lengthy and I shall say no more of it here.
Let me now come on to the main topic, the question of what role, if any, mentality should play in the development of Everett's ideas. I will approach this obliquely; first of all, I would like to draw attention to an aspect of the debate over the foundations of quantum mechanics that Lockwood has omitted completely. I want to make clear that Everett's approach is the only approach to quantum theory which applies uniformly to relativistic and non-relativistic theories alike. Not only the superposition principle, but also the principle of relativity, are preserved intact. In contrast, state reduction theories require that all of the basic equations be rewritten, with no guarantee that this can be done in a covariant way, consistent with relativity. In any case we simply do not have the new equations. We are taken back to the early days of the subject, to the late 1920s. Nor is the situation any better in the case of deterministic hidden variable theories such as Bohm's. It is true that in this case we at least have models for the 'free' theories, the purely kinematic cases, but the 'beables' of the theory need not be localized-so we do not as yet have an explanation of why we see localized events-nor are they described covariantly. This is only to emphasize that there is an important distinction between different approaches to the problem of measurement that is often lost sight of. Most approaches aim to revise the physics, but it is also possible-and surely as philosophers we are required to investigate this-to revise philosophy. Everett's approach, like the Copenhagen interpretation, is a philosophical theory or more properly a metaphysics. The difference is that Copenhagen philosophy is instrumentalist or perhaps Kantian, and that in consequence it can make no sense of cosmology. Everett's explicit aim was to find an alternative resolution to the problem of measurement that does allow the theory to be applied to cosmology.
But what sorts of hypotheses can we make in metaphysics?-I mean, what can we hope to tamper with? It is very natural to suppose we should look to the mind-body problem or, one step removed, to the nature of language. Nowadays we are inclined to suppose that the only legitimate sphere of metaphysical speculation lies in language and the mind. And so it has been; Bohr, the philosopher of language, and Everett, the philosopher of mind. Lockwood may be right to say that Everett was the first 'manyminds' theorist. He did focus on the concept of memory or memory sequence and he did understood the objectivity of phenomena in terms of what is encoded in memory.
But there is another style of metaphysics, perhaps more old-fashioned, which considers the concepts of substance, attribute, time, and identity, of which mind is only a part. Everett can also be placed in this tradition. The fundamental concept, in this case, has nothing to do with memory sequences or the nature of mind, but with the notion that words such as 'reality' and 'existence' and 'actuality' are to be understood in purely relational terms. That is, it is not that 'X exists' but that 'X exists relative to Y', or 'X is actual relative to Y'. In terms of states, this means that the state which is 'actual' is likewise relativized: '|L) is actual relative to | ])\ This is Everett's concept of relative state. What Everett provided is a rule, given a tensor-product structure-that is, a way of writing down the total state as a product |L)| T) or entanglement c,|L)| f) + c 2 |R}| [)-for defining one state as actual relative to another. In the case of a product state |L)| t) it follows that |L) is actual relative to | ]). In this case there is little more to say, and we may as well leave it at '|L) is actual and so is | ])\ It is in the entangled case that things become interesting, and we have both '|L) is actual relative to | f)' and '|R) is actual relative to | J.)'.
How then are we to reconcile these two statements? Which is really actual? But that is just to fail to accept the discipline. There is no ordinary notion of reality or actuality, not the position of the moon in the night sky or the thought of supper, which is not a relativized reality. And to what is it relativized?-only at this point does anything to do with human experience arise: if we are talking about things that we observe or that are connected to us, the answer is that they are relativized to ourselves, to our concrete physical forms. Or else they are relativized to proxies which are actual relative to ourselves, such as computer-controlled experiments. The proposal is not, then, that everyday events are only illusory, that 'in reality' there is only the universal state. It is that 'reality' is relational, and that everyday facts are perfectly real and perfectly objective relations. If there is a sense in which 'really' there is only the universal state, it is not a sense which has any ordinary application. Perhaps it is the sense in which space-time as a whole is real, or in which numbers and other mathematical objects exist.
It may be that Lockwood will agree with all this, particularly given that he has himself remarked on the parallels with a relational approach to tense in the philosophy of time: given that 'the present' is merely what is simultaneous with something else, do we really have tense? Or is the difference between the past and future somehow illusory"! Lockwood, I hope, will answer yes and then no. And I am in absolute agreement with him that we no more have or need a preferred basis in the case of valuedefiniteness, than we have or need a preferred family of time-slices in the case of tense. But the situation is not entirely clear-cut; there is also the thesis-as advocated, for example, by Griinbaum-which holds that 'the now' is objective and yet intrinsically 'mind-dependent'. Just what this means, and how mentality or mind enters the picture, is the point at issue.
A first remark is that, given relationalism, Albert's and Loewer's argument for dualism falls by the wayside. The reality of matter, matter as it is ordinarily understood, is exactly the same as the reality of persons, no more and no less, namely a relational reality. So it is not that there is the matter of Alice's brain, as ordinarily understood, that is entangled with the apparatus (whereas Alice's consciousness is not). It is true that we might one day have a very unordinary sort of matter, namely macroscopic entanglements, actually produced in the laboratory-whereupon this would be real in the relational sense-but I see no pressing need to say just what this unordinary thing would be, relative to that experimental context, particularly since it would have to be strictly shielded from outside influence.
What is pressing is the question of what is real to Alice. To answer this, we must understand what 'Alice' refers to. It is surely a relativized reality-Alice relative to something else. But given an entanglement, there are very many relational facts, very many things real relative to other things. So why is one basis 'special' or 'preferred', as that alone in which for each state we have a conscious Alice? This is the preferred basis problem, and at this point the mentalistic aspects of Lockwood's picture come to the fore. What is involved is a 'consciousness basis', a mysterious and remarkable 'given': only thus does consciousness arise, associated with one or another state of this basis. Further, which basis this is has nothing do with the fundamental physics. In this way Lockwood places the nature of mind firmly at the core of his interpretation. This is also how he distinguishes the approach from the many-worlds approach of DeWitt and Deutsch.
With this I am (almost) in complete agreement. Understood aright, Lockwood is correct to say that the preferred basis has nothing to do with the physics. But when we do understand this aright, we also see that we need make no more mention of mentality here than in classical physics.
How is this possible? Consider again our poor Alice. We could equally have said that we are interested in relative states which describe a functioning apparatus, and only derivatively obtain a different Alice in each case. We could, for that matter, consider the relative states of electron spin eigenstates, or of superpositions of eigenstates of the apparatus pointer. In exactly the same way, we can consider what is 'now' relative to any event in space-time that we care to consider. What is special about events in the career of a human observer? The answer is nothing at all, from the point of view of the basic physics; everything,from the point of view of epistemology and experimental confirmation.
In other words, the preferred basis problem only arises in so far as we try to develop a physical theory of epistemology, be it of humans or animals or computers or whatever, a theory of what sorts of things or sequences of relative-states could count as epistemic agents. To specify a preferred basis is, as it were, to specify an epistemic community. And of course we do have to do this, and it is, in a certain sense, a part of the physical theory (as an empirical discipline, it does have to deal with the concept of 'observation'). But exactly the same is true of classical physics. For example, given a space-time model in general relativity, it could be asked 'what is observable?' in the simple sense of 'What will I see?' Although it is quite reasonable for the physicist to respond that the question is ill posed as it stands, that we must further specify who or what is doing the observing and by what means-what, for example, would be seen by an observer light-years in extent? Or on the event horizon of a black hole? Or to a being made out of anti-matter?-although this is reasonable, all the same, we should have paradigm cases of experiments and observable phenomena.
These possibilities are not, of course, ordinarily considered. We take it for granted that we have human observers in mind, and we take it for granted that we know what human observers are-how they are to be characterized in terms of the theory. Classically, what that amounts to is something sufficiently close to common-sense ideas so as hardly to need comment. Quantum mechanically-in the relative-state framework-it appears enormously problematic, so problematic that Lockwood can only speak of it as an absolute mystery.
I shall come back to this in a moment. First let us agree that if it is allowed that the physics need make no mention of an epistemic community, to which questions of observability and verification are referred, then there is no preferred basis problem in quantum mechanics and indeed no preferred basis. The Everett theory is then complete as it stands, and we need to make no mention of consciousness or mind or anything else of this sort. Let us also agree that this knowledge is tacit in classical physics. Finally, let us agree that we should make some epistemic community explicit, or make explicit what is ordinarily observable, and that it then follows-in both cases, quantum, and classical-that there must be supplementary statements saying just what this is, and that these supplements will have a very different character from ordinary scientific statements. Let all of this be granted.
The question now is how we are to proceed. In either case, quantum or classical, there are two obvious options. One is to provide a physical description of typical epistemic agents-precise enough to specify what can be observed by such agents-and the other is to give a physical description of a typical environment of an epistemic agent, the sort of environment to which that agent is adapted, particularly with respect to things which it controls and which it can therefore perceive. Correspondingly we have the strategy of Everett, who talks in terms of memory sequences and records, concepts bound up with information processing, and we have the strategy of Bohr, who talks in terms of 'classical descriptions of the apparatus' and 'the classical world' (that is our environment).
But neither Everett nor Bohr could really deliver. Everett only dimly saw that there was a preferred basis problem, and he had no very good idea of how 'the observer' could be characterized so as to define it. Bohr understood the preferred basis problem better, but he could only appeal to 'classical mechanics' or 'the classical world', something that he had not expressed at all in terms of quantum mechanics and which seemed completely incongruous in consequence. Moreover, in Bohr's writings it was confused by the question of what an experiment is designed to measure, as though it is this which determines the properties that are to be valuedefinite, and the question of the sort of language that can be used in various situations. These are the instrumentalist aspects to his philosophy.
What of the situation today? The second strategy, whereby epistemological questions are dealt with by the definition of a specific kind of environment, is understood as the problem of how we are to define a 'quasiclassical domain', a regime (in terms of energy, scale, and numbers of degrees of freedom) and associated basis (typically diagonalizing 'hydrodynamical' variables), where not only are interference effects between sequences of component states (or 'histories') vanishingly small, but where these histories also obey approximately deterministic laws ('quasiclassical laws'). And here there has been considerable progress (this is the 'decoherence theory' that Lockwood referred to); a regime of this kind arises wherever there are massive systems weakly coupled to large numbers of much lighter systems, given only that the dynamics is local. All of this can be understood in purely quantum mechanical terms. This is, then, a 'natural' basis, and it surely does describe the environment that we see about us. The other approach, where we define 'the observer' directly, rather than an appropriate environment, is in effect to suppose that it is exactly these approximate laws, associated with a quasiclassical domain, that 'constitute' our physical structure, so that we are defined in terms of them. It is in consequence of this that these laws also govern the environment to which we are adapted. Again we can take the further step and ask why is it that structures of this kind are conscious-of why, so to speak, we are these structures-but again we need not take this step, nor is the situation here any different from the classical case.
With that, I claim, the theory is complete. Modulo such questions as the interpretation of probability, nothing more needs to be added. Likewise, given a space-time model in general relativity, the theory is complete given a specification of the epistemic community in terms of particular sorts of world-lines, and time-slices adapted to those world-lines (see e.g. Stein [1991] ; in roughly the same way Lockwood spoke of a time coordinate 'adapted' to the microwave background). Modulo the interpretation of time-like relations as time, nothing more needs to be added. In neither case-unless it is to account for intuitive notions of 'passage' and identity over time-need we make any mention of mentality.
Or at least that would be the situation if we did not have the additional worry, which is related to worries over the nature of probability, as to whether it makes any sense to suppose that we can be identified with certain kinds of phenomenological laws, describing correlations among components of the universal state. The difference between quantum and classical theory comes down to this: whereas classically it does not seem strange to us that we are associated with particular physical scales, and particular regimes of energy and temperature-that we should characterize ourselves in these physical terms-it does seem strange to us that we are associated with a particular decoherence regime to the universal state. This notion of a 'decoherence regime', as defining what sorts of things we are, is foreign to us. This is not how we ordinarily think of ourselves. For that reason, it is even demanded (Dowker and Kent [1994] ) that the notion of 'an observer' must be shown to require a particular choice of decoherence regime. According to them, quantum mechanics must be supplemented with a 'theory of experience', and not the mere specification of a quasiclassical domain or merely specifying what is observable 'for us'. And to some extent Dowker and Kent are right. We should not take so much on trust. In fact we already have the beginnings of a 'theory of experience' in supposing that we are 'constituted' by certain phenomenological laws. We can go further; it is not hard to show that there are a priori connections between decoherence and the notion of observation, and evolutionary adaptation, albeit falling short of the demonstration that what is needed is a quasi-classical domain. But we should not forget how much we take on trust in more conventional contexts, and how odd it would seem to insist on such a proof in classical physics. We can give reasons why biological systems are roughly of the scale and complexity that we see, and the scale and complexity does matter as to what is 'observable' for such systems; but classical physics does not hang in the balance.
How is it that we can be characterized in any sort of physical terms at all? Why is it, or how is it, given that we are one sort of thing at one time, that we are also that sort of thing at another time? Lockwood, beginning from this question or mystery, proceeds to express quantum mechanics entirely in terms of it. But we could have done exactly the same think in classical physics; a great many philosophers, from Berkeley and Hume to Kant and Mach, from Russell to Carnap of the Aufbau, did precisely that. In those cases idealism was considered in the face of a known and familiar metaphysics, Newtonianism and common-sense realism; Lockwood is considering the same questions in the context of quantum mechanics, but without any comparable realist metaphysics. That is his choice, but we need not follow him; a realist metaphysics is possible as well, that makes no more concessions to idealism here than in the case of classical physics.
